Monthly Risk Spotlight: April 2025

AMERICAS 

The Switzerland of Central America No More: Organized Crime and Rising Insecurity in Costa Rica
In the past five years, Costa Rica has been undergoing a quiet transformation. The idyllic Central American nation known for its clean beaches, pristine jungles, and political stability has been the go-to destination for many travelers looking to experience the eco-tourist hotspot, without the violence and crime. Celebrated as the Switzerland of Central America, Costa Rica has recently faced an unprecedented surge in drug-related crimes and violence, which, if left unchecked, may impact the nation’s reputation as a safe destination option for risk-averse travelers.

Costa Rica’s latest troubles began far from its borders, in Colombia and Peru, ly, where narcotics are cultivated. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) have established lucrative smuggling routes in these nations, using regional ports to traffic narcotics towards the United States (United States) and Europe. Like many modern trends and trajectories, COVID-19 was pivotal in the changes witnessed in narcotics trafficking. Significant crackdowns on established routes across Colombia and Peru forced TCOs to actively look for new, less policed, and well-positioned geographical locations to both store and transit narcotics.

TCOs viewed Costa Rica as a place to consolidate their logistical infrastructure by making the nation a key transshipment point. Domestic ports, primarily used to export bananas, pineapples, and other tropical fruits to the global markets, had relatively lax security and were soon utilized to trade illicit drugs such as cocaine and fentanyl. After the COVID-19 lockdowns were lifted, rival criminal organizations began fighting for control of this new, useful, and highly lucrative trafficking infrastructure network.

Although foreign TCOs moved in and set up their operations in Costa Rica, the muscle for any turf wars would ultimately be fought with locally sourced groups, predominantly young males, who were allured to these TCOs by the promise of high pay amid economic stagnation in the post-pandemic domestic economy. As has been previously witnessed in other regional nations where TCOs have an established influence, several tactics are infiltrated to ensure minimal disruptions to their operations. Reportedly, customs inspection officials, members of local law enforcement, as well as judicial representatives have all been complicit or actively engaged in TCO operations domestically. As a result, organized crime has periodically become more entrenched in society and with it, a slow but gradual growth in insecurity, which manifests in violence.

Ultimately, violence has been increasing domestically at a steady frequency. The most recent statistics show that in 2024, Costa Rica experienced 880 homicides, the second most violent year in national history. Most of these murders were linked to TCO activity, however, other elements of criminality, such as animal trafficking and sexual exploitation, have also reached record highs. Local authorities are taking steps to professionalize and equip security services to handle these emerging and unprecedented challenges.

Costa Rica now finds itself at a critical inflection point. While the nation continues to exude its reputation for stability and eco-tourism, the entrenchment of TCOs within key economic and logistical sectors has changed the risk calculus for travelers and operators alike. The surge in homicides, corruption, and narcotics trafficking reflects a broader regional trend: that traditional “safe zones” in Latin America are increasingly vulnerable to the same criminal dynamics seen in neighboring states. Costa Rica’s transformation serves as a stark reminder that security assumptions must be continually reassessed — particularly when organized crime adapts faster than state institutions can respond.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA)

The Struggle for Sovereignty Amongst Sectarianism: Syria’s Fragmented State and the Tug-of-War Between International Powers
Sectarianism has been a significant factor in shaping Syria’s governance as well as influencing regional dynamics. However, a critical deal was introduced between Syrian President Ahmed Sharaa and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that could pave the way for greater autonomy for the country while Syria navigates its new interim government. On March 10, President Sharaa and the SDF signed an agreement to integrate all civilian and military institutions held by the SDF into the Syrian state. In principle, the agreement would dissolve the autonomous governance structures established by the SDF in northern Syria. This agreement marks a turning point in Syria’s conflict dynamics; however, it also complicates the competing interests of other international players.

Turkey and Israel are viewed to be the largest regional contenders to shape post Baathist Syria. Turkey supports Syria’s new government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist political organization and paramilitary group that overthrew former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. A cohesive Syrian government would help regulate power vacuums that might otherwise give way to terrorist groups that could potentially spill over into Turkey, causing greater regional security concerns. Turkish economic interest is also in the larger picture. With this agreement, Turkish construction companies should be better aligned to play significant roles in the redevelopment of Syrian infrastructure from the civil war. However, Turkey views the Kurdish left-wing political party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), as an extension of Syria’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group that Turkey views as a terrorist organization. Therefore, any potential for these factions governing any part of Syria deeply unsettles Turkey due to their shared border. If fully executed, the new agreement could limit fragmental governance in Syria and provide greater reassurance for Turkey.

On the contrary, Israel aims to keep Syria unstable to undermine its Arab neighbors and further insert its military presence in the region. Shortly after the fall of Assad, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) bombed Damascus and invaded the country. Presently, Israel’s occupation of Syria has expanded from the Golan Heights (Quneitra), a demilitarized buffer zone, toward Damascus. Israel is increasing its efforts to appeal to the Druze community in the Golan who mostly identify as Syrian. The Druze faith is one of the major religious groups in the Levant, with communities in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. Any efforts to unify sectarian division in Syria, such as the newly proposed deal, disrupts Israel’s objective to assert regional dominance.

The United States (United States) also played a role in the new deal by encouraging the SDF to honor the agreement. The United States has developed deep ties with the SDF since deploying troops to Syria to combat the Islamic State (IS). The deal is favorable for the United States, as a more unified Syrian state at the military level could help combat the spread of extremism in the country and greater region.

Although the deal is a step in the right direction for unification, many Kurds have expressed grievances toward the motion. Deep-seated reservations surrounding issues of Islamic jurisprudence as the main source of legislation cause concern for many Kurds. Despite the historical signage of a new deal, Syria’s abundant presence of sectarian divisions is expected to be an obstacle in the reconstruction of a new government and a hurdle for international competitors aspiring for influence.

ASIA-PACIFIC (APAC)

Cyclone Alfred and the APAC Weather Warning: A Test of Preparedness in a Changing Climate
In early March, Australia was impacted by Tropical Cyclone Alfred, which caused significant disruption across parts of Queensland and New South Wales. First observed by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) on February 28, Alfred rapidly developed into a category 2 system, with winds reaching 134 mph (215 km/h). Authorities correctly forecasted impacts to Brisbane, the Gold Coast, and Cape Byron, prompting pre-storm preparations including flood warnings, sandbag distribution, and the pre-positioning of emergency responders.

Alfred made landfall on March 8 as a category 1 cyclone, bringing severe winds, flooding, and widespread power outages. Brisbane and the Gold Coast were significantly affected, with local authorities conducting extensive evacuations. The storm resulted in one fatality and dozens of injuries and was the first cyclone to impact both cities since 1974. The incident highlighted how even forecasted storms can severely disrupt urban infrastructure and impact resident and traveler safety.

For risk managers and travel operators, Alfred reinforces the unpredictable nature of extreme weather events and the importance of proactive preparation. Adverse weather events such as Alfred often disrupt airport operations and public transport networks, leaving travelers with limited options and placing pressure on local emergency services. Without pre-established contingency plans, organizations may struggle to fulfill duty of care obligations during such events.

While Australia has significant capacity for early warning and coordinated response, many other nations in the wider APAC region face similar threats without the same level of preparedness. Nations such as Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, and the Philippines, ly, are regularly affected by cyclones but often lack robust emergency management infrastructure. This disparity highlights an essential need for risk-aware travel planning, especially in locations with constrained response capabilities.

Cyclone season in Australia typically runs from January to March, while Southeast and Northeast Asia experience most cyclone activity from May to November. Largely linked to climate change, adverse weather events are becoming more frequent and harder to predict, and the risk environment across APAC is shifting. For organizations, both locally and internationally, Alfred offers a timely reminder that resilience planning should be actively embedded in mobility strategies year-round.

Cyclone Alfred’s impact on a well-resourced country like Australia offers a valuable case study in preparedness and residual risk. The disruption to transport, infrastructure, and basic services in major cities underscores how even developed nations are vulnerable to cascading consequences from natural disasters. For those operating across APAC, where resource constraints are more pronounced, these risks are magnified.

Proactive disaster planning, real-time situational awareness, and localized contingency options are critical elements of any robust travel risk management framework. As the climate shifts and weather patterns grow more erratic, organizations must re-evaluate what preparedness truly means across a region increasingly exposed to environmental volatility.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

An Flashpoint in Upper Nile: South Sudan’s Fragile Peace and Regional Repercussions
On March 4, the White Army, an armed militia group loyal to South Sudan’s Vice President Riek Machar, attacked and seized control of a military base located in the northern Upper Nile state near the border of Sudan. Following the attack, South Sudanese military forces began placing officials and political allies of Vice President Machar under arrest. In multiple instances, reports indicated that both the security details and families of the identified officials were also detained. Allies of Vice President Machar not taken into custody were reportedly, informed that they would be placed under house arrest indefinitely. During the arrest operations carried out on March 5, military forces encircled the residence of Vice President Machar in the capital, Juba. After several hours, military forces stationed in the vicinity of the residence left their positions with no explanation provided to local media. Representatives for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) stated the arrests violated the peace agreement, and Western delegations began calling for de-escalation of the political tensions.

Escalations in the conflict occurred almost immediately on March 7, following the targeted attack of a United Nations (UN) helicopter that came under fire during an evacuation mission in Upper Nile state. During the incident and subsequent fighting, at least one crew member and 27 members of local security forces were killed. The attack prompted the United States (United States) Department of State to order all non-emergency personnel to leave South Sudan immediately due to the concern that the escalating violence may shatter the country’s fragile peace agreement.

Political tensions between Vice President Machar and President Salva Kier ignited a violent civil war beginning in 2013 and killing over 400,000 people. The war ended in 2018 when they negotiated a peace agreement; however, the agreement has not been fully implemented to date. Since the end of the civil war, prolonged periods of intense political rivalry between the president and vice president have remained common. Both Kier and Machar have long been accused by domestic and international power brokers of instigating internal conflicts to further a political agenda. Despite the peace agreement, elevated political tension and domestic security issues have created instability in the country, where any incident, regardless of its scale or severity, could hinder progress toward enduring peace and political stability

Consistent with regional precedent, most domestic tensions are driven by ethnic and tribal divisions. It is a common practice for political parties to forge alliances along such divisions and leverage elements such as long-standing historical disputes to garner political support. Fitting such regional precedent, Vice President Machar is of the same Nuer ethnic community as the White Army militia. Such elements further complicate the fact that implementing unresolved elements of the peace agreement, including agreeing on a new constitution, requires building cooperation and trust between all parties.

While no violence has yet been reported in the capital, Juba, the United States decision to evacuate non-essential diplomatic staff underscores how quickly tensions in South Sudan can spiral beyond their initial flashpoints. The domestic political landscape remains volatile, and the ethnic loyalties entwined with militia movements like the White Army complicate any efforts toward sustainable peace. For travel and security professionals, this episode highlights the necessity of monitoring not just capital-based stability, but also peripheral incidents that could trigger broader disruption. As regional dynamics remain fluid, isolated acts of violence — especially those with ethnic or political roots — can rapidly evolve into wider threats, affecting not only domestic safety but cross-border movement, humanitarian operations, and diplomatic engagement in the Horn of Africa.

EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (ECIS) 

Hungary’s Pride Crackdown: Civil Liberties, Surveillance, and Social Unrest Ahead of Annual Pride
On March 18, Hungarian authorities passed legislation banning LGBTQ+ pride-related events, including the annual Budapest Pride parade scheduled for June 28. Officials have also signaled plans to use facial recognition technology to identify and prosecute participants in such gatherings. This move marks a significant escalation in Hungary’s ongoing erosion of civil liberties and is emblematic of broader risks facing minority communities, protest movements, and international observers. This development signals the growing potential for civil unrest, state surveillance, and reputational exposure within a European Union (EU) member state previously considered politically stable.

The law, passed under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s far-right Fidesz party, adds to a growing list of repressive measures targeting sexual minorities. While officially framed as part of “child protection” legislation, critics note the law’s function is to stifle dissent and criminalize peaceful assembly — including through the threatened use of surveillance technologies — raising serious concerns about privacy rights and the criminalization of peaceful assembly.

The legislation has triggered immense backlash from human rights groups, opposition figures, and the LGBTQ+ community. Since its passage, Budapest has witnessed sporadic demonstrations, including the blockage of Margaret Bridge, and public demonstrations involving rainbow-colored smoke flares. Organizers of Budapest Pride have condemned the law as “fascism,” asserting that peaceful assembly is a fundamental democratic right. The European Union (EU) has also weighed in, with EU Commissioner Hadja Lahbib posting on social media, “We stand with the community – in Hungary & in all Member States.”

Orbán’s continued push for anti-LGBTQ+ legislation appears aimed at reinforcing his conservative base ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections. However, the emergence of the Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar, signals growing dissatisfaction with Fidesz. As credible political opposition gains traction and social tensions rise, the likelihood of further civil unrest in Hungary is increasing — particularly in the lead-up to elections.

Despite the official ban, parade organizers remain committed to holding the 2025 Budapest Pride event. Traditionally, the parade is preceded by a week of smaller gatherings, all of which now carry a heightened legal and physical risk for participants. Given the level of scrutiny and the clear intent to deter participation by local authorities, a heavy police presence is expected. This raises the potential for violent confrontations, legal crackdowns, or targeted harassment of attendees.

The recent pride ban is not an isolated legislative act but a reflection of deeper political polarization and a tightening civic space. For travelers, expatriates, and organizations operating in Hungary, the situation introduces tangible risks — from being caught in spontaneous or state-opposed demonstrations, to facing heightened surveillance or legal jeopardy simply for being present at certain locations. Stakeholders may also face reputational and compliance risks if perceived to support or engage with controversial domestic events.

With Hungary entering a period of heightened political sensitivity ahead of the 2026 elections, the potential for unrest is set to rise. In this environment, a proactive posture is highly advised: monitor event developments closely, review privacy policies and legal exposure related to facial recognition or protest participation and consider low-profile protocols for staff during politically sensitive periods. Above all, the situation serves as a reminder that in contemporary Europe, not all risk is cross-border — some is homegrown and legalized.

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